基于博弈论的流程再造实施策略研究
顾健
(重庆大学机械工程学院,重庆 400030)
摘要:针对BRP在实施过程中难以贯彻的问题,构建了在没有惩罚机制的条件下流程参与人完全信息静态博弈模型,分析结果表明流程参与人会陷入N人囚徒困境而达不到Pareto改进。在引入企业的监督检查机制后,建立了企业和员工的动态复制博弈模型,对于任意初始状态,演化结果为企业的检查概率和员工的合作概率以一定的概率收敛。
关键词BRP;囚徒困境;演化博弈;动态复制
中图分类号:F224.32        文献标识码:A            文章编号:1006-0316 (2012) 09-0029-04
Study on the implementation strategy of BRP based on game theory
GU Jian
(College of Mechanical Engineering, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China )
 
Abstract:For the difficulty of the BRP in the implementation process, this paper constructed a process participants complete information static state game model under the no punishment mechanism conditions. The analysis results showed that the participants will be in the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma so that it is diffcult to reach the Pareto improvements. On the foundation of the model, considered the enterprise's supervision mechanisms, this paper established an evolutionary game model based on two subjects of enterprise and employee. The results show that enterprise's supervision probability and employee's cooperation probability converge in a certain probability for any initial state.
Key wordsBRPprisoner’s dilemmaevolutionary gamedynamical replication

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收稿日期:2012-03-05
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871127)
作者简介:顾健(1987-),男,湖北蕲春人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为工业工程。

 

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